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In an observation on the greatness of Deleuze Jameson remarks it “was to
have confronted omnivorously the immense field of everything that was thought
and published” (182). No one, he continues, can read Deleuze without being
stunned by the ceaseless flood of references that tirelessly nourish his texts and
it is in this sense that we can speak of Deleuze “as a thinker of synthesis, one
who masters the immense proliferation of thoughts and concepts by way of as-
similation and appropriation” (182). It has always seemed to me that as much
can be said for Jameson himself and such a view is fully confirmed by this mon-
umental study of the dialectic. Valences of the Dialectic brings together Jame-
son’s writings on the dialectic over the past 20 years1 and presents detailed read-
ings of Hegel, Derrida, Deleuze, Lukács, Sartre, Heidegger, Althusser and Ri-
coeur, as well as more specific engagements with Lenin, Rousseau, and expo-
sitions of commodification, cultural revolution, reification and totality. It should
not, therefore, come as a surprise to see a certain degree of repetition and re-
statement of key Jamesonian positions that go back as far as Marxism and
Form (1971) and its concluding chapter on dialectical criticism. This being
said, certain things are worth repeating, and Jameson’s defence of dialectical
thought as an “unfinished project, which anticipates modes of thought and re-
ality that have yet to come into existence” (372) is just such a thing.
Traditionally the dialectic has been staged as either a system (Hegel) or
a method (Marx) and both views, so the current doxa has it, have been thor-
oughly discredited by contemporary philosophy and theory. The whole idea
of a closed metaphysical system with its spurious teleology is today deemed
unsustainable after the Nietzschean critique of systematic philosophizing.
Similarly the Marxian notion of dialectical method has to contend with the
charge of instrumentalization and the radical split between means and ends.
If the dialectic is simply a method (means) then what are its ends? Jameson’s
approach is to confront these dilemmas head-on and to claim the truth of both
positions—the dialectic is both system and method—but also as a form of
“praxis,” the unity of theory and practice, it is also that which transcends sys-
tem and method. For Jameson, dialectical thought is fundamentally scan-
dalous; it is provocative and perversely challenges all notions of common
sense. Contrary to the poststructuralist caricature of dialectical thought as
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1. The earliest piece in the collection, “Ideological Analysis: A Handbook,” dates back to
1981 but has undergone a number of revisions since.
closure and the imposition of identity over difference, Jameson stresses
the fundamentally paradoxical and contradictory nature of the dialectic. The
dialectic emerges when thought approaches incommensurability, but rather
than approaching such a moment as an aporia or unsurpassable blockage of
thought, the dialectic turns the problem back upon itself, revealing the truth
within the falsehood. The two great exponents of this kind of dialectical
thought in the twentieth century, notes Jameson, are Adorno and Žižek.
Adorno’s insistence on the labour of the negative and Žižek’s conceptualiza-
tion of the “objectivity of appearance” serve to remind us that we cannot re-
solve a contradiction as such but must attempt to hold the two poles of the
opposition together and “to abolish the autonomy of both terms in favour of
a pure tension” (65). The dialectical term for this pure tension is “mediation.” 
This properly dialectical refusal to abandon the supposedly discredited
categories of dialectical thought by the post-Foucauldian and post-Marxist
theories of discourse shares certain similarities to Žižek’s recent attempt to re-
cuperate the truth of totalitarian politics and his reconceptualization of Marxism.
Marxism, argues Jameson, is not a doctrine or a world view but a problematic,
the validity of which rests on its capacity to generate problems rather than so-
lutions, and to say that one is a Marxist is to align oneself with this problematic.
Notions such as “base and superstructure” or social class are not answers but
articulations of the problems themselves. The truth of such notions lies not in
our ability to identify specific forms of mediation between the economy and
say culture—although this is clearly a very useful thing to do—or in our ability
to objectively identify specific social classes but in the operations and analysis
to which the concept of class gives rise. In this sense, “class analysis, like ma-
terialist demystification, remains valid and indispensable even in the absence
of the possibility of a coherent ‘philosophy’ or ontology of class itself” (394).
Another story the dialectic has to tell is that of the subject itself and one
of the recurring themes of this volume is the tendency of the subject to dis-
solve back into object. The starting point for this, of course, is Hegel’s dialec-
tic of self-consciousness. Consciousness, observes Jameson, is always self-
consciousness and when Hegel attempts to describe the moment of self-con-
sciousness, it is famously evoked by the clash of two consciousnesses (the
Master and the Slave). The problem of self-consciousness then becomes a
problem of representation and of the impossibility of representing the self. In
short, the problem of the self is one of self-representation and one can only
represent the self by a priori positing a non-reflexive self. Jameson’s “spatial”
solution to the problem of representing self-consciousness is to see the “non-
reflexive self as itself an object within a larger field” (69). This enlargement
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of the field of consciousness then “produces what we call the self or the sense
of identity” in an analogous way to that in which “two distinct spatial objects
are set in relationship to each other by perception as such” (69-70). Jameson
returns time and again to this dialectical tendency of the self to fold back into
the object: Žižek’s “objectivity of appearance”; Deleuze’s elimination of the
Self/ Other distinction through the concept of nomadism (198); Lukács’ dis-
solution of the centred subject (216) and Sartre’s critique of the distinction
between self and things (223). The relevance of Valences to this volume of
Gramma lies in its presentation of numerous variations on the dialectic that
seek to dissolve the individual or autonomous subject and re-inscribe that sub-
ject as a collective entity in History. Jameson’s own version of this is devel-
oped in his extended engagement with Paul Ricoeur’s “magnum opus” Time
and Narrative and the formulation of a “spatial dialectic.”
For Jameson, the decline of narrative along with a schizophrenic sense of
time and the waning of history have been some of his major preoccupations in
the era of postmodernity and the engagement with Ricoeur here points to some
of the underlying assumptions of the book. If you do not buy into Jameson’s
analysis of postmodernity, then the necessity of a spatial dialect to revitalize
dialectical thinking for the twenty-first century becomes something of a moot
point. Ricoeur’s work turns on the distinction between Aristotelian time, the
time of before and after or chronology, and Augustinian time, the time of the
world where past and future are held together in the now. Another way of con-
ceptualizing this is between objective cosmological time and subjective phe-
nomenological-existential time. What is missing from this binary opposition
though is Historical time as such, or, to put it another way the totalization of
individual subjective times. Ricoeur prioritizes the subjective time but fails to
register, according to Jameson, the radical changes in time and space under
the conditions of postmodernity. The weakness of Ricoeur’s position, in short,
is his humanism and his adherence to subjective phenomenological time. For
Ricoeur, the gap between existential time and cosmological time can never be
bridged and therefore Historical time as such can never properly emerge. 
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